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ABSTRACT
We report on Krum, the rst provably Byzantine-tolerant aggrega-
tion rule for distributed Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). Krum
guarantees the convergence of SGD even in a distributed setting
where (asymptotically) up to half of the workers can be malicious
adversaries trying to attack the learning system.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The increasing amount of data involved as well as the growing
complexity of models has led to learning schemes that require a lot
of computational resources. As a consequence, most industry-grade
machine-learning implementations are now distributed [1]. For
example, as of 2012, Google reportedly used 16.000 processors to
train an image classier [8]. However, distributing a computation
over several machines induces a higher risk of failures, including
crashes and computation errors. In the worst case, the system may
undergo Byzantine failures [5], i.e., completely arbitrary behaviors
of some of the machines involved. In practice, such failures may
be due to stalled processes, or biases in the way the data samples
are distributed among the processes.
A classical approach to mask failures in distributed systems is
to use a state machine replication protocol [11], which requires
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however state transitions to be applied by all processes. In the
case of distributed machine learning, this constraint can be seen in
two ways: either (a) the processes agree on a sample of data based
on which they update their local parameter vectors, or (b) they
agree on how the parameter vector should be updated. In case (a),
the sample of data has to be transmitted to each process, which
then has to perform a heavyweight computation to update its local
parameter vector. This entails communication and computational
costs that defeat the entire purpose of distributing the work. In case
(b), the processes have no way to check if the chosen update for
the parameter vector has indeed been computed correctly on real
data (a Byzantine process could have proposed the update). Byzan-
tine failures may easily prevent the convergence of the learning
algorithm. Neither of these solutions is satisfactory in a realistic
distributed machine learning setting.
In fact, most learning algorithms today rely on a core component,
namely stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [4]. In a machine learning
setting, a cost function – depending on the parameter vector – is
minimized based on stochastic estimates of its gradient. Distributed
implementations of SGD [12] typically take the following form: a
single parameter server is in charge of updating the parameter vec-
tor, while worker processes perform the actual update estimation,
based on the share of data they draw from un unknown distribu-
tion. The parameter server executes synchronous rounds, during
each of which, the parameter vector is broadcast to the workers.
In turn, each worker computes an estimate of the update to apply
(an estimate of the gradient), and the parameter server aggregates
their results to nally update the parameter vector. Today, this
aggregation is typically implemented through averaging [10], or
variants of it [6,12].
The motivation of this work is the question of how a distributed
SGD can be devised to tolerate f Byzantine processes among the n
workers. We provide the rst provable answer to this question.
Contributions. We rst show that no linear combination (current
approaches) of the updates proposed by the workers can tolerate
a single Byzantine worker. A non-linear, distance-based choice
function, that chooses, among the proposed vectors, the vector
“closest to everyone else” (for example by taking the vector that
minimizes the sum of the distances to every other vector), might
look appealing. Yet, such a distance-based choice tolerates only
a single Byzantine worker. Two Byzantine workers can collude,
one helping the other to be selected, by moving the barycenter
of all the vectors farther from the “correct area”. We formulate a
Byzantine resilience property capturing sucient conditions for
the parameter server’s choice to tolerate f Byzantine workers. Es-
sentially, to guarantee that the cost will decrease despite Byzantine
workers, we require the parameter server’s choice (a) to point,
on average, to the same direction as the gradient and (b) to have
statistical moments (up to the fourth moment) bounded above by
a homogeneous polynomial in the moments of a correct estimator
of the gradient. One way to ensure such a resilience property is
to consider a majority-based approach, looking at every subset of
n − f vectors, and considering the subset with the smallest diame-
ter. While this approach is more robust to Byzantine workers that
propose vectors far from the correct area, its exponential computa-
tional cost is prohibitive. Interestingly, combining the intuitions of
the majority-based and distance-based methods, we can choose the
vector that is somehow the closest to its n − f neighbors. Namely,
the one that minimizes a distance-based criteria, but only within its
n − f neighbors. This is the main idea behind our choice function
we call Krum1. We show (using techniques from multi-dimensional
stochastic calculus) that our Krum function satises the resilience
property aforementioned and the corresponding machine learning
scheme converges. An important advantage of the Krum function
is that it requires O (n2 · d ) local computation time, where d is the
dimension of the parameter vector. This contrasts with the prohib-
itive O (nd ) cost of approximate agreement [9]. (In deep learning,
the dimension d of the parameter vector may take values in the
hundreds of billions.)
2 MODEL
We consider a general distributed system consisting of a param-
eter server2 [1], and n workers, f of them possibly Byzantine.
Computation is divided into (innitely many) synchronous rounds.
During round t , the parameter server broadcasts its parameter vec-
tor xt ∈ Rd to all the workers. Each correct worker p computes an
estimateV tp = G (xt , ξ tp ) of the gradient∇Q (xt ) of the cost function
Q , where ξ tp is a random variable representing, e.g., the sample
drawn from the dataset. A Byzantine worker b proposes a vector
V tb which can be arbitrary (see Figure 1).
The parameter server computes a vector F (V t1 , . . . ,V
t
n ) by ap-
plying a deterministic function F to the vectors received. We re-
fer to F as the choice function of the parameter server. The pa-
rameter server updates the parameter vector using the follow-
ing SGD equation:xt+1 = xt − γt · F (V t1 , . . . ,V tn ). We assume
that the correct (non-Byzantine) workers compute unbiased es-
timates of the gradient ∇Q (xt ). More precisely, in every round
t , the vectors V ti ’s proposed by the correct workers are indepen-
dent identically distributed random vectors, V ti ∼ G (xt , ξ ti ) with
EG (xt , ξ
t
i ) = ∇Q (xt ). This can be achieved by ensuring that each
sample of data used for computing the gradient is drawn uniformly
and independently, as classically assumed in the literature of ma-
chine learning [3]. The Byzantine workers have full knowledge of
the system, including the choice function F , the vectors proposed
by the other workers and can collaborate with each other [7].
1Krum, in Greek Κρούµος, was a Bulgarian Khan of the end of the eighth century,
who undertook oensive attacks against the Byzantine empire. Bulgaria doubled in
size during his reign.
2The parameter server is assumed to be reliable. Classical techniques of state-machine
replication can be used to avoid this single point of failure.
3 BYZANTINE RESILIENCE
In most SGD-based learning algorithms used today [3,4], the choice
function consists in computing the average of the input vectors.
Figure 1: The gradient es-
timates of correct workers
(black dashed arrows) are dis-
tributed around the actual
gradient (blue solid arrow) of
the cost function (thin black
curve). A Byzantine worker
can propose an arbitrary vec-
tor (red dotted arrow).
Lemma 3.1 below states
that no linear combination
of the vectors can tolerate
a single Byzantine worker.
In particular, averaging is
not robust to Byzantine
failures.
Lemma 3.1. Consider a
choice function Fl in of the
form: Fl in (V1, . . . ,Vn ) =∑n
i=1 λi ·Vi , where the λi ’s
are non-zero scalars. LetU
be any vector in Rd . A sin-
gle Byzantine worker can
make F always selectU . In
particular, a single Byzan-
tine worker can prevent con-
vergence.
Intuitively, the choice function should output a vector F that is
not too far from the “real” gradient д, more precisely, the vector
that points to the steepest direction of the cost function being
optimized. This is expressed as a lower bound (condition (i)) on the
scalar product of the (expected) vector F and д. If EF belongs to the
ball centered at д with radius r , then the scalar product is bounded
below by a term involving sinα = r/‖д‖. Condition (ii) is more
technical, and states that the moments of F should be controlled
by the moments of the (correct) gradient estimator G. The bounds
on the moments of G are classically used to control the eects of
the discrete nature of the SGD dynamics [3]. Condition (ii) allows
to transfer this control to the choice function.
Denition 3.2 ((α , f )-Byzantine Resilience). Let 0 ≤ α < pi/2
be any angular value, and any integer 0 ≤ f ≤ n. Let V1, . . . ,Vn
be any independent identically distributed random vectors in Rd ,
Vi ∼ G, with EG = д. Let B1, . . . ,Bf be any random vectors in
Rd , possibly dependent on theVi ’s. Choice function F is said to be
(α , f )-Byzantine resilient if, for any 1 ≤ j1 < · · · < jf ≤ n, the vec-
tor F = F (V1, . . . , B1︸︷︷︸
j1
, . . . , Bf︸︷︷︸
jf
, . . . ,Vn ) satises (i) 〈EF ,д〉 ≥
(1 − sinα ) · ‖д‖2 > 0 and (ii) for r = 2, 3, 4, E ‖F ‖r is bounded
above by a linear combination of terms E ‖G‖r1 . . . E ‖G‖rn−1 with
r1 + · · · + rn−1 = r .
4 THE KRUM FUNCTION
The barycentric choice function Fbary = 1n
∑n
i=1Vi can be dened
as the vector in Rd that minimizes the sum of squared distances
to the Vi ’s
∑n
i=1
Fbary −Vi 2. Lemma 3.1, however, states that
this approach does not tolerate even a single Byzantine failure.
One could try to dene the choice function in order to select,
among the Vi ’s, the vector U ∈ {V1, . . . ,Vn } that minimizes the
sum ∑i ‖U −Vi ‖2. Intuitively, vector U would be close to every
proposed vector, including the correct ones, and thus would be
close to the “real” gradient. However, all Byzantine workers but
one may propose vectors that are large enough to move the total
barycenter far away from the correct vectors, while the remaining
Byzantine worker proposes this barycenter. Since the barycenter
always minimizes the sum of squared distance, this last Byzantine
worker is certain to have its vector chosen by the parameter server.
This situation is depicted in Figure 2. In other words, since this
choice function takes into account all the vectors, including the
very remote ones, the Byzantine workers can collude to force the
choice of the parameter server.
C B
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Figure 2: Selecting the vector that minimizes the sum of
the squared distances to other vectors does not prevent ar-
bitrary vectors proposed by Byzantine workers from being
selected if f ≥ 2. If the gradients computed by the correct
workers lie in area C, the Byzantine workers can collude to
propose up to f − 1 vectors in an arbitrarily remote area
B, thus allowing another Byzantine vector b, close to the
barycenter of proposed vectors, to be selected.
Our approach to circumvent this issue is to preclude the vectors
that are too far away. More precisely, we dene our Krum choice
function Kr(V1, . . . ,Vn ) as follows. For any i , j, we denote by
i → j the fact that Vj belongs to the n − f − 2 closest vectors to Vi .
Then, we dene for each worker i , the score s (i ) = ∑i→j Vi −Vj2
where the sum runs over the n − f − 2 closest vectors toVi . Finally,
Kr(V1, . . . ,Vn ) = Vi∗ where i∗ refers to the worker minimizing the
score, s (i∗) ≤ s (i ) for all i .3
Lemma 4.1. The Krum FunctionKr(V1, . . . ,Vn ), whereV1, . . . ,Vn
are d-dimensional vectors, is computed in O (n2 · d ) time at the pa-
rameter server.
Resilience. Proposition 4.2 below states that, if 2f + 2 < n and
the gradient estimator is accurate enough, (its standard deviation
is relatively small compared to the norm of the gradient), then
the Krum function is (α , f )-Byzantine-resilient, where angle α de-
pends on the ratio of the deviation over the gradient. When the
Krum function selects a correct vector (i.e., a vector proposed by a
correct worker), the proof of this fact is relatively easy, since the
probability distribution of this correct vector is that of the gradient
estimator G. The core diculty occurs when the Krum function
selects a Byzantine vector (i.e., a vector proposed by a Byzantine
worker), because the distribution of this vector is completely ar-
bitrary, and may even depend on the correct vectors. In a very
general sense, this part of our proof is reminiscent of the geometric
median technique and is discussed in details in the full paper [2].
Proposition 4.2. Let V1, . . . ,Vn be any independent and identi-
cally distributed randomd-dimensional vectors s.tVi ∼ G , with EG =
д and E G − д2 = dσ 2. Let B1, . . . ,Bf be any f random vectors,
3If two or more workers have the minimal score, we choose the vector of the worker
with the smallest identier.
possibly dependent on theVi ’s. If 2f +2 < n and η(n, f )
√
d ·σ < ‖д‖,
where η(n, f ) =
{
O (n) if f = O (n)
O (
√
n) if f = O (1) , then the Krum function
Kr is (α , f )-Byzantine resilient where 0 ≤ α < pi/2 is dened by




Convergence. The SGD equation is expressed as follows: xt+1 =
xt − γt · Kr(V t1 , . . . ,V tn ), where at least n − f vectors among the
V ti ’s are correct, while the other ones may be Byzantine. For a
correct index i , V ti = G (xt , ξ
t
i ) where G is the gradient estima-
tor. We dene the local standard deviation σ (x ) by d · σ 2 (x ) =
E G (x , ξ ) − ∇Q (x )2 .
Proposition 4.3. We assume that (i) the cost function Q is three
times dierentiable with continuous derivatives, and is non-negative,
Q (x ) ≥ 0; (ii) the learning rates satisfy ∑t γt = ∞ and ∑t γ 2t < ∞;
(iii) the gradient estimator satises EG (x , ξ ) = ∇Q (x ) and ∀r ∈
{2, . . . , 4}, E‖G (x , ξ )‖r ≤ Ar + Br ‖x ‖r for some constants Ar ,Br ;
(iv) there exists a constant 0 ≤ α < pi/2 such that for all x η(n, f ) ·√
d · σ (x ) ≤ ‖∇Q (x )‖ · sinα ; (v) nally, beyond a certain horizon,
‖x ‖2 ≥ D, there exist ϵ > 0 and 0 ≤ β < pi/2 − α such that
‖∇Q (x )‖ ≥ ϵ > 0 and 〈x,∇Q (x )〉‖x ‖ · ‖∇Q (x ) ‖ ≥ cos β . Then the sequence of
gradients ∇Q (xt ) converges almost surely to zero.
Proposition 4.3 basically says that in the presence of Byzantine
workers, the parameter vector xt almost surely reaches a basin
around points where the gradient is small (‖∇Q ‖ ≤ η(n, f ) ·√d ·σ ),
i.e., points where the cost landscape is “almost at”.
Note that the convergence analysis is based only on the fact
that function Kr is (α , f )-Byzantine resilient. The detailed proof of
convergence, as well as its qualitative interpretation, can be found
in the full paper [2].
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